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Introduction
On April 10, 1998, Irish and British participants signed the Agreement
Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations (Good Friday Agreement or Agree-
ment) in Belfast, Northern Ireland, establishing a new framework for peace
and democracy in that beleaguered area.1 The Good Friday Agreement
established the democratically elected Northern Ireland Assembly, an exec-
utive and legislative authority that would give the province a home-rule gov-
ernment to represent both the pro-British, Protestant majority and the
Catholic minority. Almost three years later, however, the peace process
remains incomplete, and many of the promises of the Good Friday Agree-
ment are still unfulfilled. Decommissioning, or the surrender of paramili-
tary arsenals, has occurred only minimally. Without further movement in
this area, the power-sharing agreement could be curtailed, or even scuttled
completely, resulting in a restoration of direct rule by London.2
One of the most controversial aspects of the Good Friday Agreement is
the provision for the early release of prisoners convicted of offenses related
to the political problems of Northern Ireland. This provision was so heav-
ily debated that it threatened the continued existence of the Good Friday
Agreement.3 Under this provision, convicted members of paramilitary
organizations were eligible for release if their respective organizations
"established or ... maintain[ed] a complete and unequivocal ceasefire" as
defined by the Good Friday Agreement.4 Over 400 prisoners, both nation-
alist and unionist,5 obtained their release through this provision,6 despite
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998,37 I.L.M. 751
[hereinafter Good Friday Agreement]. The Good Friday Agreement is also commonly
referred to as the Belfast Agreement.
2. Warren Hoge, I.R.A. Asserts Onus Is Blair's in Peace Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2001, at A10; CNN, Trimble Threatens Sinn Fein Sanctions, at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/europe/UK/02/10/trimble/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2001) (stat-
ing that Protestant leaders would seek to exclude Catholic ministers from various politi-
cal bodies as a sanction for the IRA's continued opposition to decommissioning.)
3. David Trimble, Essay: The Good Friday Agreement, 22 FoPRDRMn INTr'L L.J 1145,
1164 (1999).
4. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 1 2, 37 I.L.M. at 774.
5. Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland are either loyalist (Protestant) or
republican (Catholic). The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has led republican violence
since the creation of a separate Northern Irish State in 1920. The IRA has long held the
belief that the British government split Ireland against the wishes of a majority of its
people. The goal of the IRA has been to end British "occupation" of Northern Ireland
and to bring about a United Ireland. Brian Gormally et al., Criminal Justice in a Divided
Society: Northern Ireland Prisons, in 17 CRIME ANDJus-icE 51, 59-61 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1993). The Irish National Liberation Party (INLA) and the Continuity Army Council of
the IRA (Continuity IRA) are other republican organizations that were formed by dissat-
isfied IRA members. See MicHAEL VON TANGEN PAGE, PRISONS, PEACE AND TERRORISM 51-
52 (1998). The two main loyalist organizations are the Ulster Defense Association
(UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Loyalists, also known as Unionists, sup-
port Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom, yet sometimes have committed
crimes against the state when they deemed it within their interests. Gormally et al.,
supra, at 90. Loyalists, however, see their actions as defensive measures taken in
response to republican violence. See id. at 64. Other loyalist paramilitary organizations
include the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) (a sister organization of the UDA) and the
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). John Mullin, Terrorist Mastermind Freed from the Maze,
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the fact that few other provisions of the Good Friday Agreement have been
implemented. 7 While the early release provisions of the agreement, which
are a concession to the paramilitary organizations, are followed faithfully,
there is little progress in the decommissioning of arms, as required by the
agreement. 8 In 1998 opponents of the Good Friday Agreement questioned
the logic behind the early release provision because it was uncertain
whether the ceasefire would last, and suggested that releases should only
occur when it became clear that peace was permanent.9 Three years later
peace in Northern Ireland remains uncertain, and thus the reintroduction
of dangerous players to this fragile landscape could have dire
consequences.
This Note questions the legality and prudence of-the early release pro-
visions of the Good Friday Agreement at such a crucial moment in the
history of Northern Ireland. Part I summarizes the history of the conflict
in Northern Ireland and explores the pattern of periodic internment and
release of paramilitaries during "The Troubles,"1 0 as well as the British gov-
ernment's attempt to criminalize paramilitary activity in the 1980s. Part II
describes the Good Friday Agreement and the early release process. Part
III analyzes the legality of the early release scheme in light of customary
law regarding political violence and examines the philosophical aspects of
pardons, their advantages, and disadvantages. Part IV discusses recent
events threatening the Good Friday Agreement and questions the logic
behind the release of some of Northern Ireland's most dangerous terrorists
at a time when paramilitary organizations have yet to demonstrate whole-
hearted support for the peace process. Finally, this Note concludes that
although the early release provisions were a political necessity, there was
little precedent for these provisions in international law, and the releases
significantly endanger peace in Northern Ireland.
GuARDIAN, Sept. 15, 1999, at 6; VON TAN F.N PAGE, supra, at 52. Finally, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC), the Northern Irish police force, has played a significant role in the
Troubles, a mainly Protestant force acting to protect the unionist majority from republi-
can violence. Gormally et al., supra, at 63.
6. End of Era as Last Inmates Leave Maze, BELFAST NEWs LETTER, Oct. 2, 2000, at 4.
Of the 433 prisoners released so far, 229 were associated with republican paramilitary
organizations, 193 were associated with loyalist groups, and 11 were not aligned with
either side. See Northern Ireland Prison Service, News & Information, at http://
www.niprisonservice.gov.uk (last visited Dec. 17, 2000).
7. See generally Associated Press, Key Events in Northern Ireland's Search for Com-
promise (June 30, 1999), available at http://www.wnergy-net.org/NVZ/EUROPE/MN-
01203.799 (last visited Feb. 20, 1999); see CNN, Conflict and Hope in Northern Ireland:
Decommissioning, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/n.ireland/decommissioning.
html (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).
8. See Andrew Woodcock, Trimble Blames Mo for Peace Impasse, BELFAST NEWS LET-
TER, Oct. 5, 2000 at 2; see also CNN, IRA Resumes Weapons Talks, at http://
wwwv.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/UK/03/08/nirish.talks.02/index.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2001).
9. Morning View: Release of Prisoners Put in Doubt, BELFAST News LErrER, Jan. 12,
2000, at 8; see also Woodcock, supra note 8.
10. "The Troubles" refers generally to the violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 to
the present. See generally PAUL Baw & GORDON GiLLESPIE, NORTHERN IRELAND: A CHRO-
NOLOGY OF THE TROUBLES 1968-1993 (1993).
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I. A History of Internment and Release in 20th Century Ireland
A. Internment
The practice of releasing political prisoners has played an important role in
the Anglo-Irish conflict of the twentieth century, both north and south of
the border. Following the Easter Rebellion of 1916, the British government
agreed to release all of the Irish rebels who were still imprisoned in
England, even those serving life sentences." I After the Anglo-Irish War and
partition of the island in 1920-21, a civil war raged in the Irish Free State
between those who supported the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty
between Great Britain and Ireland, and those who did not.12 The Indem-
nity (British Military) Act of 1924 absolved all parties at the conclusion of
the civil war, releasing anti-treaty Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoners. 13
In April 1922, the Northern Ireland Parliament passed the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act in response to sectarian violence in Bel-
fast. 14 The Special Powers Act conferred onto the Minister of Home Affairs
the power to "take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be neces-
sary for preserving the peace and maintaining order."' 5 In effect, the Spe-
cial Powers Act allowed for internment, the indefinite jailing of anyone who
threatened the government, without charge or trial.1 6 By 1924, however,
IRA violence in the North had abated, and all internees were released.' 7
An outbreak of IRA violence in 1938 led to another period of intern-
ment in both the South and the North. The Irish government declared a
state of emergency in order to deal with the violence and the beginning of
World War 11.18 The Northern Ireland government also re-introduced
internment in December 1938, a policy which lasted until 1946.19 Both
governments released their internees following the war, although the
Northern Ireland government conditioned the release of politically moti-
vated prisoners on their promise to refrain from violence. 20
The IRA triggered another period of internment when it launched its
1956 "Border Campaign." 2 ' The Irish government 22 instituted internment
inJuly 1957, but released many of its prisoners by March 1959.23 Others,
however, stood trial and were sentenced; the Irish government did not
release these prisoners until after the IRA announced its ceasefire, in Feb-
11. GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE DAMNABLE QUESTION 258-60 (1976).
12. Id. at 348-49.
13. Kieran McEvoy, Academic Viewpoint: Prisoners, the Agreement and the Political
Character of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1539, 1544 (1999).
14. MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 93 (1976).
15. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 5, § 1(1) (N. Ir.).
16. FARRELL, supra note 14, at 93-94.
17. McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1546.
18. Id. at 1544; see also JOsEPH J. LEE, IRELAND 1912-1985: POLITICS AND SOCIETY 223
(1989).
19. FARRELL, supra note 14, at 94.
20. McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1543-46.
21. Id. at 1547.
22. The Irish Free State left the British Commonwealth in 1949, renaming itself the
Republic of Ireland, or tire. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 49.
23. McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1545.
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ruary 1962. The Northern Ireland government also implemented intern-
ment procedures in December 1956, which lasted until 1961.24 As in the
South, the Northern Ireland government released internees, as well as
some sentenced prisoners, 25 upon the IRA's ceasefire, again conditioning
the release upon a renunciation of violence. 26
B. Special Category Status
The escalation of sectarian violence at the outset of the Troubles in the late
1960s 2 7 changed the way the British government dealt with politically
motivated offenders. By August 1971, Official IRA and Provisional IRA2 8
violence was out of control, and the British government, fearing a substan-
tial Protestant backlash, was forced to implement internment procedures. 29
The Northern Ireland government again implemented internment under
the authority of the Special Powers Act, and again allowed the executive to
by-pass the courts and permit the police to arrest any person whom they
believed to be a member of a paramilitary organization.30 Violence was so
widespread by this point, however, that internment proved to be ineffective,
if not counter-effective. 31 The government held a large number of intern-
ees in prisoner of war-like camps;32 it held those actually sentenced (with-
out juries) of schedule crimes in compounds, or "cages," segregated by
paramilitary affiliations. 33 The prisoners convicted of scheduled terrorist-
type 34 crimes were given "special category status," a de facto prisoner of
24. FARRELL, supra note 14, at 94.
25. Within eighteen months of the end of the Border Campaign, the North released
all republican prisoners sentenced for criminal offenses during the campaign on the
belief that it was "unfair to continue their imprisonment while their comrades were qui-
etly released." Trimble, supra note 3, at 1165.
26. McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1547.
27. The IRA commenced its modern campaign in August 1970 by killing two RUC
officers with a car bomb. CONOR GEaRTY, TERROR 118 (1991). In February 1971, the
IRA added the newly-arrived British Army to its list of targets by killing a soldier with a
machine gun. BEw & GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 32.
28. On December 28, 1969, dissenting members of the IRA announced the forma-
tion of the IRA Provisional Army Council in response to the IRA's decision to recognize
the Ulster Parliament and its apparent failure to protect Belfast Catholics during the
early years of the Troubles. This new faction has historically been referred to as the
Provisional IRA, while the original members were referred to as the Official IRA. Bv &
GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 24. By 1972, however, the Official IRA had decided to end
its campaign of violence "as it increasingly felt that it was more important to unite the
working class in Ireland rather than deal with the issue of the [partition]." VON TANGEN
PAGE, supra note 5, at 51. After the Official IRA completely ceased its violent activities,
remaining hard-liners left to form the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Id. For
purposes of clarity, any references to the IRA herein refer to the Provisional IRA.
29. BEw & GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 36.
30. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 54.
31. Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 73.
32. Id. at 72-73. Internees, or "suspected terrorists," could only be held for 28 days.
The purpose of internment during this period was to hold suspected members of the
IRA where they could not do any harm, and to gain information about the organization.
33. Id. at 70-71; VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 57..
34. "Scheduled offenses . . . included murder, manslaughter, serious offenses
against the person, arson, malicious damage, riot, offenses under the Firearms Act
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war status.3 5 Neither of these procedures matched the control and disci-
pline associated with traditional prisons, and, as a result, the government
had no control over the prisoners inside.36 Prisoners were held apart from
prisoners of opposing paramilitary organizations. However, they could
freely associate with members of their own organizations, and, as a result,
continued to participate in paramilitary training and strategy.3 7
C. Criminalization
By 1974, the British government had given up on internment and special
category status. A committee set up to review the government's effective-
ness regarding terrorism recommended, in 1975, that prisoners convicted
of terrorist acts should be treated as ordinary criminals, and not be
awarded special category status. 38 The British government adopted this
policy at the same time that it reduced the role of the army in favor of
strengthening the police.3 9 The government gave a cut-off date of March 1,
1976, after which anyone found guilty of a terrorist crime would be consid-
ered a "normal criminal."40 Both nationalist and loyalist prisoners
objected to the new policy.4 1 Enforcement of prison rules, the wearing of
prison uniforms, and compulsory prison work were among the policies
designed to demoralize the paramilitaries. 42 This shift in policy demon-
strated the British government's intention to portray the situation not as a
political crisis, but as one of law and order. 43 It also marked the end of the
internment and release era.
D. Post-Criminalization
Criminalization did not last. On March 1, 1981, the fifth anniversary of
the ending of the special status, IRA prisoner Bobby Sands began a hunger
strike in the Maze prison.44 Sands's hunger strike, and the hunger strikes
(Northern Ireland) of 1969 and the Explosives Substances Act of 1883, robbery and
aggravated burglary, intimidation, membership of proscribed organizations, and collect-
ing information likely to be of use to terrorists." Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 75 n.6.
35. Id. at 70. There are five prisons in Northern Ireland: Crumlin Road, the Maze,
Maghaberry, Magilligan, and the Young Offenders Centre. The Maze Prison, formerly
known as Long Kesh, is the main prison for paramilitary offenders. Inside the Maze, the
segregated organizations elected commanding officers and established command struc-
tures, which were generally recognized by the authorities. Id. at 53-55.
36. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 58 ("Life behind the wire was comparatively
relaxed; indeed, the republican prisoners would sometimes talk of the place as the 'lazy
K' and direct much of their time into preparing to continue the fight once they left, or
thinking about escape.").
37. Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 70.
38. Id. at 70-71.
39. Id. at 77.
40. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 59.
41. Id. at 60.
42. McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1540.
43. See id.
44. BEw & GILLESPIE, supra note 10, at 144.
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of other prisoners, was an attempt to resurrect special category status.45
By the end of the year, it was apparent that the hunger strikes had suc-
ceeded in part: prisoners could wear their own clothes; they had regained
their remission time; and they were no longer required to work in the
prison.46 The hunger strikers, however, were unsuccessful in regaining
political status. 47
Although the British government was able to resist succumbing to the
demand of political status during the hunger strikes, the 1980's did wit-
ness a move towards political recognition and away from Criminaliza-
tion.48 One aspect of this trend was the emergence of the Life Prisoner
Review Board. In January 1985, the Northern Ireland Office announced
that it would review life sentences of prisoners and evaluate each individ-
ual case for release.49 Prisoners were to be released "on license," which
means that they would return to jail and serve their original sentences if
they were to commit further offenses or otherwise associate themselves
with "risky conduct."50 By 1995, 374 life prisoners were released from
prison.5 1
45. The hunger strikers hoped to achieve five goals through the protests: the right to
wear their own clothes; to avoid prison work; to freely associate within the prisons;
organized recreational facilities; and restoration of remission time lost due to the "Dirty
Protests." Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 83; see also VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at
60. IRA protests during the Criminalization period were known as the "Dirty Protests"
because prison rules required a prisoner to wear his prison uniform in order to leave his
cell. As many Republican prisoners refused to wear these uniforms at all, they were
confined to their cells. As the protest escalated, prisoners refused to leave their cells to
wash or to go to the toilet. Because the protesters did not follow prison rules, they were
no longer entitled to the fifty percent remission program afforded to Northern Irish
prisoners at the time. Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 80-81.
46. Id. at 85.
47. See VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 64 ("These concerns had been addressed
without conceding the point of political recognition.").
48. See Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 57-58 (referring to this period as "normaliza-
tion," because it reflected the acceptance of political violence and division as being part
of "normal" life in Northern Ireland). According to Gormally, "the main principles of
normalization derive from a number of political decisions:
The first is an acceptance that the prison system, at any rate, is not a mecha-
nism that can "defeat" political violence; rather it is a mechanism for managing
some of its consequences, and an abandonment of the policy of criminalization,
insofar as it is designed to coerce prisoners into a practical and symbolic accept-
ance of the status of common criminals.
The second is a recognition that political conflict and division are perma-
nent.., and hence must be seen as "normal."
The third is an acceptance ... [that the] structures that have been adapted to
contain political violence ... are ... just one specialized part of the 'normal'
criminal justice system."
Id.
49. Factors to be considered included the original crime, the prisoner's role in the
crime, and the prisoner's age and background. VON Tuar'N PAGE, supra note 5, at 74.
Prisoners, however, were not required to renounce violence or their allegiance to violent
organizations. Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 101.
50. Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 100.
51. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 76 (stating that only eleven prisoners were
returned for revoking their licence).
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The releases authorized by the Life Sentences Review Board silently
reflected a return to special category status for paramilitary prisoners.
Under that system, paramilitary prisoners with life sentences served, on
average, only twelve to thirteen years for their crimes; life prisoners in
England serve a minimum of twenty years.5 2 Supporters of this policy per-
ceived a return to politicization in what they characterized as "constructive
engagement" with the paramilitary prisoners, viewing imprisonment not as
a means to eliminate violence, but rather a means to controlling those who
committed it.5 3
Others saw the release scheme, as well as the granting of other privi-
leges such as Christmas and summer paroles, as a means to "secure a more
peaceful society in Northern Ireland through the use of liberal and human-
itarian penal policy."5 4 In any event, these measures appeared intended to
appease paramilitary organizations in the hopes of achieving a reduction in
violence. The British government thus began to bring paramilitaries back
into the political process, concomitantly abandoning their Criminalization
policies.
In August 1994, the major republican and loyalist paramilitary organi-
zations declared a ceasefire and immediately demanded the release of pris-
oners as a reward for their actions.5 5 The Republic of Ireland initiated the
release process by freeing nine prisoners in December 1994.56 Parliament,
through the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Bill of 1995, raised
the remission of sentences from one-third to one-half, facilitating the
release of eighty-eight prisoners in November 1995.5 7 The ceasefire, how-
ever, did not endure, largely due to the government's insistence that
decommissioning occur before paramilitary organizations could enter the
peace talks. 58 The Republic of Ireland suspended its release program, but
the British government did not repeal its new remission standard. 5 9 Ulti-
mately the failure of the ceasefire proved that the IRA and the Loyalists
demanded political recognition, and that peace in Northern Ireland would
come only at the cost of political compromise.
52. Gormally et al., supra note 5, at 100.
53. Id. at 101.
54. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 77.
55. Id. at 78-77; see also McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1548-52.
56. The Republic of Ireland, however, did place conditions on its release policy such
as refusing to release any prisoner convicted for the murder of a member of its national
police force, the Garda, or any prisoners who were members of an anti-peace process
organization such as the INLA or Continuity IRA. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 76,
79-80.
57. Id. at 82-83. Since the fifty percent remission only affected ten percent of the
paramilitaries in prison, Sinn Fein criticized the government for not setting a higher
remission rate. Id. at 82.
58. See id; see also McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1551. McEvoy does suggest, however,
that the prisoner issue did create resentment within the IRA that played a part in its
return to violence. Id. at 1551-52.
59. The British most likely stuck with the new remission rate because most Loyalists
were maintaining their ceasefire. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 85.
Vol. 34
2001 Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement
II. Mechanisms for Release
A. The Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement was the result of over a decade's worth of
negotiation and peacemaking.60 Its roots trace back to the Anglo-Irish
Agreement of 1985, in which the United Kingdom granted the Republic of
Ireland a consultative role in the governance of Northern Ireland. 6l The
Anglo-Irish Agreement, however, was forged without the advice or consent
of Ulster Unionists, most likely because concessions to the South were so
fundamentally inconsistent with their political status. 62 Though the agree-
ment might have spurred an increase in unionist paramilitary activity,63 its
inclusion of the Irish government did force unionists to reassess Parlia-
ment's direct rule of Ulster.64 As First Minister Designate of the new
Northern Ireland Assembly and leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP),
David Trimble wrote: "the desire to restore a measure of local control over
local decisions became stronger, even if acquiring such control could only
be achieved at the price of a compromise with northern nationalism."65 Of
course, any compromise with the nationalists meant including Sinn Fein,
the political wing of the IRA, in the compromise. 66 Nationalists would
view any agreement between Unionists, Nationalists, and the government,
and any accompanying ceasefire, as an end to the war that had been raging
since 1968.67 As always, Sinn Fein and the IRA expected to be rewarded
60. Trimble, supra note 3, at 1145.
61. See Bav & GILLESPm, supra note 10, at 187-89. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was
widely hated by Unionists because it did not affirmatively define the status of Northern
Ireland, except that its status could be changed only by a consent of the majority of the
Northern Irish people. Critics also objected to the establishment of the Inter-Govern-
mental Conference, which gave the Republic of Ireland a voice in Northern Irish mat-
ters. Id.
62. See Trimble, supra note 3, at 1145.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1152.
65. Id.
66. See Gerry Adams, To Cherish a Just and Lasting Peace, 22 FoH~A~M Itrr'L LJ.
1179, 1181-82 (1999).
Sinn Fein recognized that progress required honest dialogue between the partici-
pants, good faith in seeking agreement, and Irish republicans becoming agents
for change and working to manage that change peacefully and
democratically ....
... a successful process of negotiation that will lead to a settlement requires a
number of essential elements: . . .it requires a good faith engagement on all
sides; it must be inclusive, with all parties treated as equals and their mandates
respected....
Id.
67. The Good Friday Agreement "is an attempt not only to redefine the politics of
the region but also, more importantly, to end a 300-year-old cycle of political violence
and community conflict, and finally remove the gun from Irish politics for good ....
The paramilitaries, however, would never be willing to simply hand over their weapons
over to the UK or Irish government, as this would constitute to them a surrender.",
Michael von Tangen Page, Arms Decommissioning and the Northern Ireland Peace Agree-
ment, 29 SEcuarrY DIAL OGUE 409, 409-10 (1998).
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with the release of their imprisoned members at the end of the conflict.6 8
The Good Friday Agreement provides "for the release of [qualifying]
prisoners ... convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland or, in
the case of those sentenced outside Northern Ireland, similar offences."69
Early release in the United Kingdom came about under the Northern Ire-
land (Sentences) Act of 1998.70 Ordinary prisoners in the United King-
dom are entitled to remission of sentences, similar to the U.S. practice of
granting parole. 71 Since 1995, prisoners in Northern Ireland were entitled
to one-half reductions of their sentences, but the Northern Ireland Act
increased this reduction to two-thirds for qualifying prisoners. 72 The
Good Friday Agreement also provides for the release of any qualifying pris-
oner who is still incarcerated upon the two-year anniversary of the begin-
ning of the early release program. 73
The Good Friday Agreement contains implied safeguards regarding
the early release program. Paragraph two of the Prisoner's section of the
Good Friday Agreement also maintains that the situation shall be "kept
under review,"74 implying that a change in the stance of a paramilitary
organization would halt the release of its prisoners. Paragraph three of the
Prisoner's section directs each government to initiate a review process to
determine the release dates in which the reviewers must take into account
"the need to protect the community."75 Writing in 1999, David Trimble,
leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, stated that this term directed the
reviewing boards to come to the conclusion that the released prisoner is
not likely to revert to terrorism upon his or her release. 76 Trimble also
maintained that the Good Friday Agreement allows the government to
recall released individuals to finish their terms if they join organizations
not complying with the ceasefire or take part in terrorist acts.77 Although
the terms of the Good Friday Agreement do not contain language support-
68. Because of the tradition of releasing interned prisoners at the end of the earlier
conflicts, peace-talk participants, most notably the IRA, "were aware of the precedent,
which reinforced the expectation that early releases would occur." Trimble, supra note
3, at 1165.
69. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 1 1, 37 I.L.M. at 774.
70. Trimble, supra note 3, at 1165. No enabling legislation was needed in the
Republic of Ireland, where all prisoner releases are a matter of government discretion.
Id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 3, 37 I.L.M. at 774. Prison-
ers who committed scheduled crimes before April 10, 1998 but who were sentenced
afterwards must serve a minimum of two years. Consequently, a small number of
inmates remained in prison after July 28, 2000, the two-year anniversary of the com-
mencement of the early releases. See Ruth O'Reilly, Rioting Prisoners Cause 'Substantial'
Damage, PREss Ass'N NEWSFILE, Jan. 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, PANEWS
File. Three such prisoners were released in October 2000. See Northern Ireland Prison
Service, Early Releases Under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, available at http://
www.niprisonservice.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
74. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 2, 37 I.L.M. at 774.
75. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 3, 37 I.L.M. at 774.
76. Trimble, supra note 3, at 1165.
77. Id. at 1165-66.
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ing these assertions, its enabling statute, the Northern Ireland (Sentences)
Act of 1998 requires that prisoners be released subject to a "licence," which
allows the Secretary of State to recall any prisoner that resumes terrorist
activity. 78 Trimble also interpreted the second sentence of Paragraph two
of the Good Friday Agreement as giving the governments the ability to
abandon their early release programs if circumstances "generally
change[d]."' 79 Such a reading, however, has been shown to be false, as the
early releases continued during the crisis over decommissioning.8 0
The current crisis in Northern Ireland centers on the IRA's failure to
hand over its arsenal pursuant to the Good Friday Agreement's "Decom-
missioning" section.8 1 By signing the Agreement, "[a]ll participants
accordingly reaffirm[ed] their commitment to the total disarmament of
paramilitary organisations ... within two years following endorsement...
of the agreement."8 2 The Agreement authorizes the Independent Interna-
tional Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) to "monitor, review and
verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms."8 3 At the insistence of
the non-paramilitary parties to the Agreement, republican inclusion in the
new democratic government is dependent on decommissioning.8 4 The
Good Friday Agreement, however, does not contain a provision that ties
decommissioning to the early release provisions: it only contains language
that allows the Irish and British governments to review which organiza-
tions are "maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire," which is
completely independent of decommissioning. 85 The IRA's resistance to
decommissioning is, in a large part, due to its belief that "the symbolism of
their handing over weapons before the end of the process [is] too much like
a surrender."8 6
B. The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act of 1998
The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act of 1998 serves as the enabling stat-
ute for the early release provisions of the Good Friday Agreement.8 7 Pris-
oners serving life sentences are eligible for release if they satisfy four
conditions.88 First, a prisoner's sentence must have been passed in North-
78. David McKittrick, 'Ruthless' Loyalist Commander to be Freed Today, INDEP.
(London), Sept. 14, 1999, at 6 ("The authorities retain the power to recall to prison
anyone believed to have become re-involved in terrorism."); see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 99-104.
79. Trimble, supra note 3, at 1166.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14.
81. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Decommissioning, 1 3, 37 l.L.M. at
770; see also Warren Hoge, Standoff on Arms Poses New Threat to Ulster Accord, N.Y.
TINiEs, Jan. 29, 2000, at A6.
82. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Decommissioning, c 3, 37 I.LM. at 770.
83. Id. 114.
84. Trimble, supra note 3, at 1167.
85. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, c 237 I.L.M. at 774.
86. von Tangen Page, supra note 67, at 411.
87. c. 35, pmbl. (stating that "an Act to make provision about the release on licence
of certain persons serving sentences of imprisonment in Northern Ireland").
88. Id. § 3(2)(b).
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ern Ireland for a "qualified offence."89 Second, the prisoner must not be a
supporter of a paramilitary organization, or a "specified organisation." 90
Third, the prisoner may no longer be a member of a specified organization,
or must not be likely to "become concerned in the commission, prepara-
tion or instigation of acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of North-
ern Ireland."9 1 Finally, the prisoner must not pose a danger to the
public.92
"Qualified offences," for purposes of the first condition, are offences
committed before April 10, 1998, the date of the Good Friday Agreement,
and which, when committed, were "scheduled offences" within the mean-
ing of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973, 1978,
1991, or 1996.93 "Scheduled offences" under these acts include a wide
range of offences including murder, manslaughter, riot kidnapping, false
imprisonment, wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, caus-
ing explosion likely to endanger life or damage property, manufacturing or
possessing explosives, and hijacking. 94
"Specified organisations" are to be determined by the Secretary of
State and include any organization that is involved in promoting, or
encouraging a terrorist campaign concerning Northern Ireland, and "has
not established or is not maintaining a complete and unequivocal
ceasefire." 95 The Act instructs the Secretary of State to consider whether
an organization is committed to democratic processes, whether it has
ceased committing or preparing for violent acts, is promoting violent acts,
and is cooperating with the Commission on Decommissioning. 96 These
provisions mirror Paragraph two of the Good Friday Agreement, which
states that no prisoner who is a member of an organization that has not
"established or [is] not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire"
shall receive an early release. 9 7 As a result, any prisoner convicted of a
scheduled offence committed before April 10, 1998, could apply for early
89. Id. § 3(3)(a).
90. Id. § 3(4); see also infra text accompanying note 95.
91. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, § 3(5)(a)-(b).
92. Id. § 3(6). This final condition does not apply to prisoners sentenced to a fixed
term, who are only required to fulfill the first three conditions, so long as they were
sentenced for at least five years. Id. § 3(2)(a)-(3)(b).
93. Id. § 3(7)(a)-(b).
94. See generally Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, sched. I.
95. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, § 3(8)(a)-(b). Such organizations
were referred to as "Proscribed Organisations" under the various Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Acts included the IRA, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hEireann,
the Red Hand Commando, Saor Eire, the UFF, the UVF, the INLA, the Irish People's
Liberation Organisation, and the UDA. See, e.g., Northern Ireland (Emergency Provi-
sions) Act 1996, sched. 2. The LV and the Continuity Army Council were added by the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1996. Id., amended by Northern Ire-
land (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 (Amendment) Order 1997, SI 1997/1403. The
Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders were added by the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1996. Id., amended by Northern Ireland (Emergency Pro-
visions) Act 1996 (Amendment) Order 1999, SI 1999/525.
96. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, § 3(9).
97. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 1 2, 37 I.L.M. at 774.
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release except those who were members of the Real IRA. 9 8
The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act of 1998 also contains many of
the safeguards written into the Good Friday Agreement. Most importantly,
the Act releases both fixed term and life prisoners on licence. 99 The
licences are subject to certain conditions: that the prisoner does not sup-
port a paramilitary organization, does not become concerned with terrorist
activity, and does not become a danger to the public.10 0 The Secretary of
State may revoke a licence if he believes the prisoner has, or is likely to,
break a condition, and such prisoner will be detained to finish his sen-
tence.10 1 The Act also authorizes the Secretary of State to suspend, and
revive, the early release program.10 2 A suspension order prevents a pris-
oner from obtaining eligibility for release, and also prevents the release of
any prisoner already deemed eligible for release. 10 3 Suspension orders,
however, have no effect on any licenced prisoners who have already been
released from prison. 10 4
However, the Good Friday Agreement's reliance on the safeguards in
the licence program is misleading. For example, in February 2000, when
the new Northern Ireland government temporarily collapsed,10 5 over three
hundred prisoners had received their release under the Sentences Act, yet
the Secretary of State could have revoked the licences of only ninety-five of
the released prisoners. 10 6 Most of these licensees were serving life
sentences, are subject to the licence for the remainder of their lives, and
could be returned to jail merely upon suspicion of renewed terrorist activ-
ity. 10 7 The remaining released prisoners, who were not sentenced to life
imprisonment, are only subject to their licence until the time at which they
would have served fifty percent of their sentence, and many had already
98. Vincent Kearney, Terrorists May Have Last Laugh, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb.
6, 2000, available at http://wwv.Sunday-times.co.uk/cgi-bin/Backlssue? (last visited
Mar. 2, 2001). Although Kearney lists Continuity IRA, the Red Hand Defenders, and the
Orange Volunteers among the organizations that were ineligible for release, these organi-
zations had been added to the list of Proscribed Organizations by amendments to the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1996. See supra note 95.
99. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, §§ 4(a), 6(2).
100. Id. § 9(1).
101. Id. § 9(2)-(3); see also Northern Ireland (Sentences) Bill, 313 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(6th ser.) (1998) 1083 ("If released prisoners break the licence in any way, they will be
taken back and serve their full sentence." (quoting Marjorie Mowlam, Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland)) [hereinafter Northern Ireland (Sentences) Bill], available at http:/
/vww.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/cm/cmvo313.htm.
102. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, § 16(1). Then Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, Marjorie Mowlam, assured Parliament that the Sentences Act
included this safeguard: "As a further safeguard, if circumstances deteriorate in North-
ern Ireland, the programme of release will be stopped and prisoners will not be
released." Northern Ireland (Sentences) Bill, supra note 101.
103. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, § 16(2).
104. Id. § 16(4).
105. See Path to Peace, Introduction, at http:/www.ireland.com/special/peace/
intro.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
106. Ian Graham, Breach of Ceasefires Would Spell Disaster, BELFAST NEws LETTER, Feb.
17, 2000, at 8.
107. Id.
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passed that point by February 2000.108 The only constraint upon these
individuals is that, should they commit new offenses and be convicted of
those crimes, they will once again return to internment. 10 9 If the peace
process had broken down after the two-year anniversary of the early
releases, and violence had resumed, the Secretary of State could, at best,
have halted further releases and recalled the 143 prisoners who had been
sentenced to life.1 10 The other 255 paramilitaries would have been
untouchable, posing a huge threat to public safety at a very volatile time.
The Secretary of State's power to issue orders suspending the release
program did not give opponents of the program the assurances that they
demanded. Not only would suspension orders during the release period
not affect those already released, 1 ' but also the decision to issue such an
order would have been a political decision with grave consequences. In
February 2000, the IRA broke off its talks with the IICD, yet Secretary of
State Mandelson did not issue such a suspension order. 1 12 Perhaps
Mandelson did not do so because he knew that such an order would have
done more harm than good. Sinn Fein stated that it would oppose any
such order, and that doing so would reduce the likelihood of IRA decom-
missioning. 113 Accordingly, the power to issue suspension orders under
the Sentences Act has yet to be exerted, and it is unlikely that it ever will be.
The IRA could stall on decommissioning1 14 for as long as it cared to, and if
the Secretary of State were to suspend the release, the IRA would walk away
from the Agreement with most of its members out of jail. The Secretary
thus is in a no-win situation: if he suspends the release program, the IRA
walks away from the Agreement; yet he cannot force the IRA to adhere to
the Agreement if he cannot suspend the program.
III. Politically Motivated Violent Offenders and International Law
The Good Friday Agreement represents, to the IRA and other paramilita-
ries, the final step for which they have been waiting. The freedoms of the
108. Id.
109. Id. So far, one prisoner has been brought back for violating his licence. Since
releases began pursuant to the Good Friday Agreement, thirteen other licensees have
been charged with offences, none of which were terrorist-related. These offences are not
violations of the terms of the licences, so the licensees will be treated as normal
criminals. Northern Ireland Prison Service, News & Information, at http://
www.niprisonservice.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
110. 'Don't Betray Peace' Pleads Mum, BELFAST NEws LErER, July 28, 2000, at 4.
111. See supra text accompanying note 104.
112. Christopher Walker, Unionists Anger as Terrorist Jail Releases Go On, TIMES
(London), Feb. 12, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File ("The Northern
Ireland Secretary said yesterday that prisoner releases would not necessarily be halted
with the reimposition of direct rule.").
113. Id.
114. Most paramilitary organizations, not just the IRA, have not initiated plans for
decommissioning. The main focus remains on the IRA, however, because unionist orga-
nizations such as the UVF and UFF have conditioned their decommissioning on the
IRA's. Id. Only the LVF has begun decommissioning, as it handed over weapons to the
IICD in December 1998. John Mullin & Ewen MacAskill, Loyalists Pile on the Pressure,
GuARDLAN (London), Aug. 31, 1999, at 1.
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Special Category Status days have returned, and paramilitaries have
achieved the political acceptance that they have been seeking since the days
of Criminialization. Under the Good Friday Agreement, paramilitary pris-
oners are treated as true political prisoners, perhaps even prisoners of
war.11 If the Good Friday Agreement is to treat paramilitary terrorists as
political prisoners or prisoners of war, however, one must make sure that
they genuinely qualify for these categories. Additionally, the Good Friday
Agreement and the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act can be seen as grant-
ing post-conflict pardons to the prisoners. If so, the logic behind pardons
in these circumstances should also be investigated.
A. Prisoner of War Status
It is imperative to consider whether the paramilitaries indeed attained
"prisoner of war" status under international law. Paramilitaries were not
"prisoners of conscience" deserving freedom 1 6 because they were not
imprisoned for their beliefs or associations alone,117 but rather for having
committed "scheduled offences" as set out in the various emergency provi-
sions acts.118
Under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August, 12 of 1949 (Geneva Convention), "prisoners of war" are
to be "released and repatriated" at the conclusion of hostilities." 9 North-
115. There are many in the United Kingdom who do not realize that they have granted
this status to the paramilitary prisoners. Conservative Party leader William Hague
denounced the February 2000 IRA initiative: a national day of reconciliation on which
the IRA would begin to hand over its arms and the British Army would begin its with-
drawal from Northern Ireland. Hague wrote that such a gesture would "bestow moral
equivalence and equal legitimacy" on IRA murders, and "would concede the totally false
and perverted IRA argument that it has engaged in a 'legitimate struggle' against an
'army of occupation.'" William Hague, Comment: Don't Treat Terrorists Like Soldiers,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 23, 2000, at 28.
116. See STATUTE OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL art. 1 (amended 1983).
[T]the object of AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL shall be to secure throughout the
world observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by:
a) irrespective of political considerations working towards the release of and
providing assistance to persons who ... are imprisoned, detained or otherwise
physically restricted by reason of their political, religious or other conscien-
tiously held beliefs or by reason of their ethnic origin, sex, colour or language,
provided they have not used or advocated violence (hereinafter referred to as
'prisoners of conscience) 
....
Id.
117. See C.P. Walker, Irish Republican Prisoners: Political Detainees, Prisoners of War
or Common Criminals?, 19 THE IIuSH JUIUST 189, 225 (1984) (concluding that IRA claims
for special treatment have no basis under British or international law). Walker adopts
the findings of Amnesty International that there were no "prisoners of conscience" in
Northern Ireland, rejecting the claims of paramilitaries. Id. at 201. Walker does not
allow that any person prosecuted solely for membership in paramilitary organizations
could be characterized as a "prisoner of conscience." Id.; Cf. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra
note 5, at 1-18, admitting that Politically Motivated Violent Offenders (PMOVs) are not
"prisoners of conscience" as defined by Amnesty International, but suggests that their
different motivations might call for special treatment.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
119. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 118, 6 U.S.T. 3317 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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ern Irish paramilitaries, however, were not prisoners of war as defined in
the Geneva Convention. 120 Article four of the Convention defines prison-
ers of war as members of the regular armed forces of a party to the conflict
or members of militias or voluntary resistance movements belonging to a
party to the conflict. 121 Members of militias or resistance movements,
however, must meet four additional conditions to achieve prisoner of war
status: they must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates; they must have a distinct symbol, recognizable at a distance; they
must carry their arms openly; and they must conduct their operations
within the laws and customs of war.122 While paramilitary leadership
structures may satisfy the first of the four conditions, Republican and Loy-
alist terrorists rarely wear uniforms or carry their arms openly, and, by
attacking civilians, have not followed the customs of war. 123 Accordingly,
under the Third Geneva Convention, Northern Irish paramilitaries should
not be afforded prisoner of war status and the associated right to auto-
matic release at the conclusion of the conflict. 124 Yet the Good Friday
Agreement confers prisoner of war status and its benefits on the prisoners
even before a lasting peace has been achieved.
120. Id. art. 4.
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present convention, are persons belong-
ing to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the
enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict ....
(2) Members of other militias and members of other voluntary corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if its territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the fol-
lowing conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations with the laws and customs of
war.
Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See voN TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 36-37.
124. It is additionally doubtful that Republicans or Loyalists could rely on the 1977
Protocol to the Geneva Convention which liberalized the conditions for recognition as a
party to an armed conflict because they have not been "visible to the adversary while
[they have been] engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack
to which [they are] to participate." Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts, adopted June 8, 1977, art. 44, 16 I.L.M. 1391. Neither the Republic of Ireland nor
the United Kingdom has ratified the treaty, voN TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 37-38; see
also Walker, supra note 117, at 208-25.
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B. Political Offenders and the Political Offense Exception
1. "Purely" versus "Relative" Political Offenses
The Good Friday Agreement, while not declaring the paramilitaries prison-
ers of war, must recognize the prisoners as political offenders in order to
justify their release.12 5 The Agreement, however, does not make an impor-
tant distinction that has evolved in the common law: the distinction
between "purely political offenses" and "relative political offenses." Simply
put, a "purely political offense" is an action conducted against a sovereign,
constituting a threat to its political ideology, but lacking the elements of a
common crime. 12 6 Purely political crimes which do not cause a private
harm include sedition, treason, and espionage. 12 7 A "relative political
offense," on the other hand, is either a purely political offense that does
have the elements of a common crime, or a common crime with ideological
motives. 128 The beneficiaries of the early release provision must be classi-
fied as "relative political" offenders because their actions have caused pri-
vate harm and resemble common crimes more frequently than they
resemble sedition, treason, and espionage.
2. Varying Theories Behind the Political Offense Exception
In the context of extradition there has been great variance in the breadth of
offenses covered by the political offense exception.129 Under one such
application of the political offense exception, the "political-incidence"
exception, States refuse to extradite criminals if their acts were incidental
125. For a comprehensive definition of PMOVs, see generally VON TANGEN PAGE, supra
note 5, at 1-17. Von Tangen Page, however, classifies all Northern Irish terrorist activity
as "absolute" political offenses, i.e., crimes the target of which is the "ruling power's
value system as a whole ... motivated for ideological or political rather than selfish or
personal reasons." Id. at 2. This Note, however, rejects the position that all terrorist
activity for which the early release prisoners were convicted targeted the "ruling power's
value system." Loyalists by definition are not attacking such a system, and it is question-
able whether IRA attacks on other paramilitaries would qualify either. Id.
126. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Prac-
tice, in INrERNA-noNAL TERRoRIsM AND POLMCAL CaiwEs 405 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1975) Although Bassiouni describes the differences between "purely political offenses"
and "relative political offenses" as they pertain to extradition treaties and their respective
"political offense exceptions" (in which many states refuse to extradite political offend-
ers to states where they might be persecuted for their political actions), his analysis of
the distinction provides a relevant principle for the analysis in this Note. An offender is
deemed not blameworthy and not extraditable when his or her conduct falls under the
political offense exception. A prisoner who is not extraditable if found in another State
should also be released at the conclusion of hostilities if he is imprisoned within the
State in which the conflict exists. Id.
127. Id.; see also In re Richard Eckermann, 5 Ann. Dig. 293, 295 (Sup. Ct. Just. Guat.
1929) ("Universal law qualifies as political crimes sedition, rebellion and other offenses
which tend to change the form of government or the person who comprise it; but it
cannot be admitted that ordering a man killed with treachery, unexpectedly and in an
uninhabited place, without form of trial or authority to do it, constitutes a political
crime.").
128. Bassiouni, supra note 126, at 408.
129. See id. at 412.
Cornell International Law Journal
to and formed part of a political disturbance. 130 An English court adopted
this standard when it refused to extradite one individual sought for the
murder of a Swiss government official, admitting that only case-by-case
analysis was suitable for such determinations (although it refused to
announce an exact definition of the exception).' 3 ' The House of Lords
did, however, later add that for the exception to apply, the offense must be
directed against the opposition government. 132 This additional require-
ment provides an important distinction for Ulster prisoners. If the same
logic applied to the prisoners, the only prisoners whose actions could have
been excused would have been those who directed their violent acts at the
British government. This would have automatically eliminated most Loyal-
ist prisoners, who, because of their allegiance to the United Kingdom, usu-
ally did not commit violence against the State. It would have also
eliminated the many Republican or Nationalist prisoners whose actions
were committed against Loyalist and Protestant paramilitary targets and
civilians.133
A second approach to the determination of the political offense excep-
tion is the "injured rights" theory. This theory focuses on the nature of the
rights injured rather than the motives of the offender. 134 To constitute a
political offense, conduct must be directed against the government or sov-
ereign and affect the political organization of the State.135 While this the-
ory receives some acceptance in Europe, 136 it provides little insight to the
Good Friday Agreement beyond that provided by the political-incidence
theory.
A third theory, the "political motivation" theory, developed in Europe,
seeks to modify the English political-incidence theory. 137 The political
motivation theory attempts to "correlate the ideological beliefs of the
offender and the proportionate effect of his acts or offenses and the politi-
cal purpose in trying to reach an equitable result which locks in the other
theories."' 38 If the political offense is murder, for example, it must be
shown that this was the sole means to attain the political aim. 139 Use of
this theory would render many paramilitary crimes unextraditable. The
130. Id.
131. In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149 (1891).
132. Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville, 2 All E.R. 204 (1973); see also Bassiouni, supra
note 126, at 414.
133. In the first twenty years of the Troubles, approximately one-third of the over
2700 deaths caused by the IRA were of members of security forces, one-third of the dead
were civilians, and the final third were members of other paramilitary organizations,
GEawRy, supra note 27, at 118. Although the IRA has tried to limit its campaign to "legiti-
mate targets," it sees civilian deaths as part of its overall political strategy to drive the
British out of Northern Ireland. Id. at 120-23.
134. Bassiouni, supra note 126, at 422.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 421-22.
137. Id. at 423.
138. Id. at 424. European courts, however, have been inconsistent in their application
of this theory.
139. Kitr v. Ministre Public Fdral, 34 I.L.R. 143 (Switz. Fdr&al Trib.) (1961).
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crimes of Johnny Adair, a Loyalist paramilitary leader, exemplify the types
of offenses that would not qualify as a political defense in the extradition
context. The random murders of Belfast's Catholics' 4° certainly were not
the sole means for the UFF to achieve its political goals.
3. The Political Offense Exception and British Extradition Policy
The early release of prisoners was not controlled by the customs of extradi-
tion. In both extradition and early release contexts, however, prisoners
who commit politically motivated crimes are treated differently from ordi-
nary criminals. The political offense exception to extradition became a
part of customary international law during the rise of constitutionalism
and popular government. 14 1 With it came the idea that citizens have "a
moral right to rebel against tyranny, [and] those who fail in the attempt
should find a place of refuge in a foreign land."'142 This ideal was not uni-
versally accepted: Thomas Aquinas felt that overthrowing a tyrant was jus-
tified only if the revolution caused less damage to the public than the
tyrant.1 43 Others reject terrorism as a means to achieve political gains, as
it undermines the sanctity of human life. 144 The foundations for the politi-
cal offense exception, however, are the same as those for granting special
treatment to politically motivated offenders who are held in their own
nations.145 Since not all politically motivated offenders fall into the politi-
cal offense exception (their crimes do not advance their political aims),
special status should be withheld from those prisoners whose crimes were
inadequate to achieve a political aim.
Britain's recent extradition policy has attempted to limit the breadth of
the political offense exception. Strangely, its extradition policy contradicts
its special status policy and its move away from Criminalization. In the
past, Republican terrorists were able to rely on the political offense excep-
tion to block their extradition from the United States when their crimes
were directed against the British military. 14 6 The United Kingdom sought
140. One of the favorite activities of Adair's Ulster Freedom Fighters was to "drive
through a Catholic quarter of Belfast and shoot anyone they saw;" when Adair was asked
"if he ever had a Catholic in his car, he replied: 'Only a dead one."' Loyalist Leader Freed
from N. Ireland Jail, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 14, 1999, available at LEXIS, News
Library, AFP File. Adair was convicted for directing terrorism, and it is believed that he
was responsible for up to thirty Catholic killings. Monika Unsworth, Loyalist Leader
Freed from Maze, IRSH TiNEs, Sept. 15, 1999, at 7.
141. MANUEL R. GARcIA-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 74
(1956).
142. Id. During this period, Liberal thinkers emphasized the right to rebel against
oppression. This principle is problematic for the justification of any Loyalist crimes,
since they are not rebelling against what they perceive to be governmental tyranny.
143. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 12.
144. PAUL WILCINSON, TERo.ROisM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 65 (1977).
145. VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 11.
146. See In re Extradition of McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing an
unrecorded decision from the Northern District of California, in which the court held
that McMullen fulfilled the political offence exception under the original treaty because
the PIRA was engaged in a political uprising against the British, that McMullen's crimes
were committed at the behest of the PIRA, and that they were in furtherance of its politi-
Cornell International Law Journal
to reduce the number of such exceptions by amending its extradition treaty
with the United States, and narrowed the number of political offense
exceptions by specifically excluding crimes such as murder, manslaughter,
and crimes using explosives. 147 This hard line approach against Ulster ter-
rorists runs counter to the practice of granting terrorists special status:
crimes that are not considered offenses with a political character in the
Ulster Treaty are essentially the same crimes classified as scheduled
offenses in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts. 148 At the
same time, the British government both recognizes (in the Good Friday
Agreement and the Emergency Provisions and Sentences Acts) and denies
(in the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty of
1985 (Supplementary Treaty)) the idea that political motivation can play a
role in an offender's culpability.
British extradition policy after the Supplementary Treaty abandons all
analysis of the nexus between the criminal act and the political aims of the
offender. The treaty specifically names crimes in article I(e) - (1), and does
not grant discretion to decision-makers. 149 Crimes deemed unextraditable
in Cheng v. Governor of Pentonvillei50 are now excluded from the political
offense exception. Under this treaty, only "purely political" offenders will
be able to rely on the political offense exception and "relative political"
cal objective); In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17746, at *104-5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), affd 668 F.2d. 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that Mackin's
attempted murder of a British soldier was incidental to his role in the PIRA's political
uprising); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
147. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-
U.K., art. I, T.I.A.S. No. 12,050. [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty].
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following offenses shall
be regarded as an offense of political character:
(e) murder;
() manslaughter;
(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
(h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, includ-
ing the taking of a hostage;
(i) the following offenses relating to explosives:
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious dam-
age to property;
(2) or conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who
intends either himself or through another person to endanger life or
cause serious damage to property;
(j) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either
himself or through another person to endanger life; or
(1) or the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the
arrest or detection of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as
to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered;
(1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
Id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
149. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 147.
150. See supra text accompanying note 132.
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offenders will be treated as ordinary criminals. It was possible that during
the releases such a relative political offender could be returned to Northern
Ireland and incarcerated as an ordinary criminal, only to become subject to
the Good Friday Agreement, and thus be given special status and rights as
a political prisoner. In fact, in September 2000, after most of the prisoners
were released, Secretary Mandelson announced that terrorist fugitives
could return to Northern Ireland and seek release under the Good Friday
Agreement. 151
C. Pardons
When paramilitary prisoners were freed through the early release provi-
sions of the Good Friday Agreement, they were essentially granted pardons
for their crimes. A pardon, as opposed to an amnesty, occurs after an
offender's guilt has been determined; an amnesty is a determination not to
prosecute. 152 Thus, the Good Friday Agreement is not an amnesty because
it is not a decision to forgive actors who have not yet been prosecuted. It
specifically does not cover any politically motivated acts of violence com-
menced after the date of the agreement.' 5 3 Instead the Good Friday Agree-
ment reduces the sentences of those whose guilt has already been
established through trial and conviction under a democratic criminal jus-
tice system.' 54 While the Good Friday Agreement might not forgive the
prisoners that it releases, 155 it clearly imitates acts of pardoning, not
amnesties.
The case against pardons centers on the idea that forgiveness under-
mines the criminal justice system. 'Immanuel Kant denounced the use of
pardons as unjust to society. 156 Kant's objections are based on the theory
151. Fury at Freedom Deal for Provos on Run, BELFAST NEws LErrER, Sept. 30, 2000, at
1. Mandelson also announced that many extradition requests would be abandoned stat-
ing, "It is clearly anomalous to pursue the extradition of people who appear to qualify
for early release under the Good Friday Agreement scheme, and who would, on making
a successful application to the Sentence Review Commission, have little if any of their
original prison sentence to serve." Id.
152. ALFONSO J. DAmIco, DEMOCRACY AND THE CASE FOR AMNESTY 5 (1975). In an
amnesty, the state essentially "forgets" that the offender has committed a crime, or
makes a decision not to judge past behavior. Id. at 5. A pardon represents an act of
forgiveness or charity on behalf of the state. Id. Quite often pardons are included in a
larger amnesty proclamation. See id. at 5. For example, United States President Andrew
Johnson's Christmas Amnesty of 1868 stated an unconditional decision not to prosecute
those who acted in rebellion, and pardoned all those already convicted for political acts
during the war. Id. at 30; see also KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5 (1989).
153. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, c. 35, § 3(7)(a).
154. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners, 112, 37 I.L.M. at 774.
155. Quite to the contrary, many see the early release program dearly as a result of
paramilitary politics, and in no way an act of forgiveness, or the removal of a stigma. See
generally McEvoy, supra note 13.
156. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 337 (Jonathan Ladd
trans., 1965) (1797). According to Kant, a sovereign's pardon of a crime (either by
reducing or ending the sentence) committed by one subject against another constituted
"the greatest injustice toward his subjects," and therefore argued that the sovereign
should not have absolute power to pardon such crimes.. Id. at 108. Kant would grant
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that the law makes a promise to law-abiding citizens to punish wrongdoers.
Pardons thus are unfair to citizens who obey the law because wrongdoers
enjoy an unfair advantage over them.157 Retributivists' 518 also argue that
pardons bring about injustice, but base their criticism on the offender
escaping the punishment that he or she deserves. 159 On the one hand, the
strongest objections to pardons derive from the principles of expressive
retributivism, which holds that society inflicts punishment in order to
eliminate the appearance of the offender's superiority and promote the
value of the victim. 160 On the other hand, general utilitarian objections to
pardons are premised on the belief that, to deter crime, punishment must
be distributed without exceptions. 161
Expressive retributivism provides the most sobering perspective on the
early release scheme, as it is the victims of paramilitary violence who lose
the most under this scheme. Nowhere is this perspective better illuminated
than in the anti-release campaign of Michelle Williamson. Williamson's
parents were killed when a bomb ripped through a fish market on Belfast's
Shankill Road. 162 Yet her parents' killer, Sean Kelly of the IRA, was
released on July 28, 2000, one of the last prisoners to be released under the
early release scheme. 163 Kelly also benefited from the Christmas parole in
the sovereign only the power to pardon crimes committed against him, but "he cannot
allow a crime to go unpunished if the safety of the people might be endangered thereby."
Id. Kant subscribed to a retributivist theory of criminal law, stating that "[o]nly the Law
of retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly the kind and degree of punish-
ment .... All other standards fluctuate back and forth and, because extraneous consid-
erations are mixed with them, they cannot be compatible with the principle of pure and
strict legal justice." Id. at 101. For Kant, "judicial punishment," which was necessary
for legal justice, could not be used for any purposes other than that the offender had
committed a crime that made him unfit to be a citizen. Id. at 99-100. ("The law con-
cerning punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to who rummages around in
the winding paths of theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by
releasing the criminal punishment or by reducing the amount of it .... [(Legal)] justice
ceases to be justice if it can be bought for a price.").
157. See MooRE, supra note 152, at 31-32.
158. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231 (1968).
[A] simple, indeed a crude, model of retributive theory . . .will assert three
things: first, that a person may be punished if, and only if, he has voluntarily
done something morally wrong; secondly, that his punishment must in some
way match, or be the equivalent of, the wickedness of the offence; and thirdly,
that the justification for punishing men under such conditions is that the return
of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done, is itself just or morally good.
Id.
159. See MooRE, supra note 152, at 75 ("The punishment... must be commensurate
with what the offender deserves, and what the offender deserves depends on the offense
committed. The more serious the crime, the more serious the punishment .... [T]he
seriousness of a crime is measured by the amount of harm generally done by acts of that
sort and by the degree of culpability.").
160. JEFFRmE G. MURPHY &JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 130 (1988).
161. See MooRE, supra note 152, at 38. A pardon can undermine deterrence because
it may lead one to infer that he will be able to escape punishment for his crimes. Id.
162. Olga Craig, A Daughter's Vendetta, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 26, 1999,
at 26.
163. 'Don't Betray Peace' Pleads Mum, supra note 110. The explosion that killed Wil-
liamson's parents killed seven others, which means that Kelly will serve less than one
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1999.164 The early release scheme undermines the values of expressive
retributivism: society appears to value Kelly's Christmas with his family
more than it values Michelle's rights as a victim. 1 65 As Williamson states,
her crusade to keep Kelly and similar prisoners in jail was "not political but
simply a clear cut case of right and wrong."166
IV. Recent Events and the Logic Behind the Early Release Program
On February 11, 2000, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter
Mandelson, suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly, the province's new
institution established by the Good Friday Agreement.' 67 Mandelson
based his decision to do so on the IRA's failure to comply with the decom-
missioning provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, returning power over
the province to the British Parliament.168 The IRA claimed that it had until
May 2000 to comply with the decommissioning provisions as that is the
date set out in the text of the Good Friday Agreement.' 69 The IRA,
incensed over the return to direct rule, broke off its negotiations with the
decommissioning commission on February 15.170 Despite the return to
direct rule, Mandelson did not halt the release process, a move that drew
heavy criticism from Northern Irish unionists.' 71 Since the onset of the
releases, the logic of the program has been questioned, even undermined,
by the consequences of releasing the region's most dangerous citizens.
This section selects a few of these consequences, and scrutinizes the com-
promise the Irish people made for peace.
year for each of his murders. See John Mullin, Freed IRA Man Stays Silent on Arms Role,
GuAIRDis (London), Dec. 17, 1999, at 7.
164. Gemma Murray, Michelle's Battle Moves to the Court of Appeal, BELFAST NEWs LET-
TER, Jan. 7, 2000, at 9. "Festive cheer was practically eliminated from her heart days
before Christmas when broken-hearted Michelle watched Sean Kelly walk through the
turn-stile free from the Maze prison into the welcoming arms of his mother." Id. North-
ern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson extended the Christmas parole in 1999 to all of
the prisoners in the Maze, even those who would not normally have qualified. John
Mullin, Cancelled Parole Left One Costly Inmate with Maze All to Himself, GuARMAN
(London), Jan. 4, 2000, at 5.
165. "Victims of Northern Ireland's violence have empty seats at their dinner tables.
How could he go out and enjoy himself and recover from hangovers while I lay flowers
at the grave of murdered parents?" Murray, supra note 164 (quoting Michelle
Williamson).
166. Id.
167. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Strand 1, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, il, 37 I.L.M. at 756 ("This agreement provides for a democratically
elected Assembly in Northern Ireland... capable of exercising executive and legislative
authority.").
168. CNN, Northern Ireland Talks Collapse After IRA Walks Out, at http://cnn.com/
2000/WORLD/europe/02/15/ira.talks.o2.index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2000).
169. Hoge, supra note 81.
170. CNN, supra note 168.
171. Walker, supra note 112. Peter Mandelson did, however, state on February 20,
2000, that he might soon review the early release scheme "alongside the ceasefires and
progress on decommissioning." John Murray Brown, Mandelson Hints at Further Cuts in
Ulster Troops, FINAN CiLl Tmims (London), Feb. 21, 2000, at 4 (quoting Peter Mandelson).
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A. The Beneficiaries of the Early Release Program
1. The Mad Dog
Considerable criticism of the program emerged following the release of
Johnny "Mad Dog" Adair, the two hundred and ninety third prisoner to be
released under the Good Friday Agreement, on September 14, 1999.172
Many considered Adair, a member of the UFF, to be the most notorious
loyalist paramilitary, so much so, that then Northern Secretary Maureen
Mowlam at first challenged the Sentence Review Commission. 173 Adair
had only served four years of a sixteen-year sentence. 17 4 One commentator
stated, "Adair's freedom is a stark illustration of the price Northern Ireland
is being asked to pay for peace. To keep the political talks going, mass
murderers, Loyalist and Republican, are being released." 175
Adair's crimes, and the campaign of terror that he led, are undeserv-
ing of political status. It is believed that the UFF under his leadership was
killing more people than the IRA. 176 Adair's philosophy was "that, by kill-
ing Catholics, pressure would be brought on the IRA by the nationalist
community to stop its attacks on the security forces and loyalists." 177
Claiming that every Catholic was a target, Adair once told a reporter, "The
UFF put the fear of God into the republican movement. We were attacking
their homes, their safe houses, their drinking dens."178 Adair's crimes
were in some ways politically motivated: his goal was to deter IRA activity
through retributive violence. Certainly the UFF attack of Sinn Fein head-
quarters in 1993179 could be labeled a politically motivated crime. The
majority of Adair's victims, however, were killed in retaliation for republi-
can attacks. 180 Even if Adair did have political motives for his crimes, the
motives do not mask the ruthlessness and sectarian hatred that embodied
his crimes, 18 1 crimes that were excused by the Good Friday Agreement.
Critics of Adair's release believed that the IRA and many loyalist fac-
tions received the benefits of the Good Friday Agreement without giving
anything in return.18 2 Many Unionists, as well as conservative members of
the British Parliament, also called for the end of the releases because of
continued violence from republican and loyalist organizations. 183 Upon
Adair's release, opponents lamented that his parole "illustrated, perversely,
172. Unsworth, supra note 140.
173. Id. Dr. Mowlam withdrew her objection after receiving loyalist complaints that
no prisoner be discriminated against.
174. Id. Adair could have received a life sentence for his conviction. See infra note
185.
175. Vincent Kearney, Mad Dog at Bay, SUNDAY TIMEs (London), Sept. 19, 1999, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id. ("Most of the Adair unit's victims met their fate in the name of revenge.").
181. UFF terrorists, under Adair's command once murdered a Catholic, William
Johnston, for living with his Protestant girlfriend. Id.
182. Id.
183. McKittrick, supra note 78.
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a rare efficiency in efforts to honor the terms of the Good Friday peace
accord of 1998."184
Adair's release exposed a flaw in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act
of 1998. Since Adair was serving a fixed term (sixteen years for "directing
terrorism"'18 5), the Secretary of State was not required to determine if he
was a danger to the public, as is required for life prisoners.18 6 Yet there
was serious concern for the public safety regarding his release.' 8 7 The
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) told Secretary Mowlam they believed that
Adair had continued to run terrorist activities from within the Maze, and it
was likely that he could become involved in terrorist activity upon his
release.' 88
Adair's notoriety caused a potential flare-up between paramilitary
organizations. Adair has survived multiple attempts on his life, and, as
Vincent Kearney has written:
Dissident republicans could pose the biggest threat. The Real IRA ... and
two other republican groups, the Continuity IRA and INLA, are believed to
have joined forces in a coalition that is preparing for a return to war. Dissi-
dents could view an attack on Adair as a means of establishing their
credibility.
Such an attack would spark a massive retaliation against the Catholic com-
munity. That in turn would present the dissidents with an opportunity to
portray themselves as defenders of the nationalist community, just as the
Provisional IRA attempted to do so at the start of the Troubles. 18 9 Yet,
Secretary of State Mowlaw ignored such possibilities, or at least felt that
the political consequences of offending the loyalist groups outweighed
such possibilities. 190
Although Adair vowed, upon his release, that he would support the
peace process and refrain from paramilitary activity, 191 old habits die
hard. In July 2000, Adair participated in loyalist protests during which
uniformed members of the LVF fired shots into the air.192 Adair's active
184. Shawn Pogatchnik, Protestant Terrorist Adair Released in N. Ireland, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Sept. 15, 1999, at A18.
185. See Kearney, supra note 175; Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996,
c. 22, § 29 ("Any person who directs, at any level, the activities of an organisation which
is concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism is guilty of any offense and liable on
conviction to imprisonment for life.").
186. See supra text accompanying note 92.
187. Kearney, supra note 175.
188. Id. ("In January 1998 UFF units were involved in a spate of murders of
Catholics in retaliation for the INLA's murder in the Maze of Billy Wright, the Loyalist
Volunteer Force leader, a friend and mentor of Adair.").
189. See id. The IRA and INLA have tried, and failed several times to kill Adair,
including the bombing that claimed the lives of the parents of Michelle Williams.
190. See id. In January 1998, the Secretary Mowlam met with Adair and other loyalist
leaders in the Maze in order to ensure the continuance of the loyalist ceasefire in the
wake of Billy Wright's murder, "overlooking that Adair was dearly involved in the repri-
sals." Id.
191. Audrey Magee, Mowlam Frees Top Loyalist Terrorist, TIMES (London), Sept. 15,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File.
192. Campaign Fueled by Venomous Hate, BELFAST NEws LErER, Aug. 23, 2000, at 2.
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participation in the protests prompted Secretary Mandelson to revoke
Adair's license and return him to prison.1 93 Although Adair challenged
Mandelson's decision, the Sentences Review Board upheld the revocation
of his license, stating that Adair, if released, was "likely ... to breach the
terms of his license." 194
2. Above the Law
One disturbing effect of the early release program is the possibility that
some offenders may never even see the inside of a British prison for their
offenses committed during the Troubles, resulting in a quasi-amnesty.
Such fears were voiced in December 1999, as critics accused Ulster Secre-
tary Peter Mandelson of ordering authorities to refrain from apprehending
"wanted" IRA terrorists who had returned to Northern Ireland since the
agreement.' 95 According to human rights campaigners, up to ninety-three
men who had fled Ulster to avoid prosecution had returned to the prov-
ince, yet Mandelson decided to ignore these returns in order to maintain
the fragile peace process. 196 In January 2000, the Republic of Ireland's
High Court blocked the extradition of IRA gunman Angelo Fusco under
pressure from Sinn Fein, outraging many in the North.' 97 Eleven months
later, the Northern Ireland government further infuriated critics of the
Good Friday Agreement when it essentially pardoned Fusco by announc-
ing that he and three other former prisoners were free to return to North-
ern Ireland.' 98 So too did Mandelson's September 2000 announcement
that he would abandon extradition requests for fugitives who would be eli-
gible for early release upon their return to the province.' 99 If, as Prime
Minister Blair promotes, the people of Northern Ireland must "start to treat
each other like normal people,"200 must they ignore the principles of crimi-
nal justice that apply to "normal people"? The price of freeing Angelo
Fusco, and turning a blind eye to fugitives, is that the victims of their crime
never receive justice. Resentment and mistrust of the Good Friday Agree-
ment may remain in their eyes forever.
193. Why Adair is Back in Jail, BELFAST NEws LEI ER, Aug. 24, 2000, at 1-2. Mandel-
son also based his decision on intelligence reports that Adair was linked to gun running
and drug operations, as wells as sectarian intimidation. See id.
194. CNN, Release of Paramilitary Quashed, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/
europe/UK/01/09/parole/index.html (Jan. 9, 2001).
195. Graeme Wilson & Neil Sears, Mother's Agony as Soldier's IRA Killer Is Sent Home
for Christmas, DAILY MAIL (London), Dec. 18, 1999, at 5.
196. Id. Critic Vincent McKenna bemoans that it "is simply unbelievable that the
RUC has made no arrests because it doesn't know these people are back in Northern
Ireland .... [Ilt is sickening for victims of violence to see wanted terrorists walking the
streets with apparent immunity." Id. The RUC has denied that it is ignoring the return
of such terrorists. Id.
197. John Mullin, Protesters Clash with Police After Killer Denied Bail, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 7, 2000, at 7.
198. Anger over Pardon for Prison Espcapees, BELFAT NEws LETrER, Dec. 28, 2000, at
11.
199. Fury at Freedom Deal for Provos on Run, supra note 151.
200. Wilson & Sears, supra note 195.
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A sad consequence of the early release program is that some
paramilitaries have lost all respect for their criminal justice system. On
February 2, 2000, loyalist terrorists Stephen McClean and Noel McCready
were convicted of murdering two men in a pub in Poyntzpass, County
Armagh, in March 1998.201 The men smirked and joked with each other
when they each received life sentences. 20 2 McClean and McCready
laughed because they knew since they committed their crime before the
signing of the Good Friday Agreement, they would be released in less than
six months, having served a total of over just two years.20 3 But were their
crimes political? What ends were they trying to achieve? At trial their
motives were described as "mindless bigotry,"20 4 not the promotion of loy-
alist ideals. Their crimes cannot be seen as part of a loyalist campaign
against republican rebels, because the IRA had already begun their
ceasefire at the time of the murders.20 5 If the Good Friday Agreement is,
as McEvoy asserts, "an acceptance of the political motivation of paramilita-
ries,"20 6 it does not follow that McClean and McCready should be afforded
the rights normally reserved to politically motivated offenders for their
crimes of bigotry.
B. The Victims
The victims also lose under the early release system because there is no
requirement that republican or loyalist paramilitaries express contrition or
denounce their membership in their terrorist organizations. As Johnny
Adair told a reporter, "I don't regret inflicting hurt on the republican com-
munity."20 7 Yet victims and their families must sit by and watch the pris-
oners enjoy their freedom. Upon Adair's release a spokesman for Families
Against Intimidation and Terror announced, "It is a very difficult time for
victims when prisoners are released. They worry about meeting the person
on the street."20 8
Contrition has been at the heart of many other release programs.
Spanish "reinsertion" of Basque nationalists serving prison sentences for
201. David Sharrock, Loyalist Killers Treat Life Sentences as Joke, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 3, 2000, at 14. McClean and McCready, along with two others, allegedly
targeted the pub because it was their belief that only Catholics frequented the pub. Iron-
ically, Poyntzpass Catholics and Protestants frequented the pub harmoniously, and the
two murdered men were best friends: one a Catholic, the other a Protestant. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. McClean and McCready are reportedly members of the LVF. Stones,
Jonathan, No Wonder the Killers of Two Best Friends Were Joking... They Know They'll Be
Out of Prison in Six Months, MiRuoR, Feb. 3, 2000, at 8.
204. Disgust as Killers in Line for Early Release: Mums Express Anger at Sons' Murder-
ers, BIMINGHAN1 EVENING MAIL, Feb. 3, 2000, at 17. It is not clear who described their
motives as such, but it appears as if either the judge or the prosecution made this
statement.
205. The IRA commenced its current cease-fire on July 20, 1997. Associated Press,
supra note 7.
206. McEvoy, supra note 13, at 1573-74.
207. UFF Chief Reaffirms Commitment to Peace Bid, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Dec. 13, 1999,
available at LEXIS, News Library, BELTEL File.
208. Magee, supra note 191.
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their acts required both that the prisoner renounce violence, break all links
with the organization that he belonged to, declare that he would respect
law and democracy, and acknowledge the suffering that he had caused. 20 9
The example of Adair shows that the Sentences Act does not even consider
such a possibility. The danger of this is that "[e]xperience has shown that
if we do not deal with the anger and the pain which still exist in both
communities, they will return to poison the hopes of progress in the
future."210
C. Additional Threats to the System
The early release scheme has threatened the safety of the region, and events
subsequent to the releases have forced the Northern Ireland leadership to
rethink the effectiveness of the early release scheme. OnJanuary 11, 2000,
police arrested several people, including some LVF members, in
Portadown, County Armagh, for the January 10 murder of Richard Jame-
son, believed by some to be a local UVF leader.211 It was alleged that Jame-
son led an attack on three LVF prisoners who were free on the Christmas
parole at a Portadown social club. 2 12 Many demanded a cessation of
releasing LVF prisoners under the early release scheme, including UUP
leader David Trimble,213 since eight LVF members were still imprisoned at
the time.2 14 UVF retaliation for Jameson's death, which would have bro-
ken its five-year ceasefire, could have endangered the early-release scheme
and the entire peace process as well.2 15 Any exclusion of LVF members
from future releases, however, would not have been based on theories of
political violence, but rather on the LVF's blatant disregard for the
ceasefire.
Richard Jameson's murder is proof that many paramilitary members
are imprisoned for sectarian violence that has little political value. Many of
the imprisoned or released prisoners were imprisoned for similar
crimes. 216 Loyalist killings of other loyalists resemble gang violence more
than they resemble violence directed at political aims. It is doubtful that
209. See VON TANGEN PAGE, supra note 5, at 139.
210. Mary Holland, Only Fresh Start Can Ease Pain and Anger, IRISH TMES, Sept. 23,
1999, at 14.
211. John Mullin, Prisoner Release at Risk if LVF Carried Out Killing, GuARIMAN
(London), Jan. 12, 2000, at 4.
212. Id. The victim's family denied Jameson's association with the UVF, stating that
his feud with the LVF was based on his stand against drug dealers in Portadown, and his
belief that the LVF controlled the Portadown drug trade. See Rosie Cowan, Murdered
Man's Brothers Deface Loyalist Murals, PREss Ass'N NEWSFULE, Jan. 16, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Library, PANEWS File; Release of Prisoners Put in Doubt, BELFAST NEws
LETTER, Jan. 12, 2000, at 8 ("[I]t can be no coincidence that the feud intensified follow-
ing the generous dispensation of the Christmas parole programme, which left only a
handful of paramilitary prisoners in jail.").
213. Darwin Templeton & Martin Breen, Terror Truce in Doubt After Man Shot Dead:
Killing Fuels Loyalist Feud Fear, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 2000, available at LEXIS,
News Library, BELTEL File.
214. Mullin, supra note 197.
215. See id.
216. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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sfich an offense would be unextraditable, even in the pre-Supplementary
Treaty era, because it is an offense of "ordinary criminals"; yet such vio-
lence has, and may continue, to warrant early release.
The greatest threat to peace is the possibility that the decommission-
ing deadlock will push the paramilitaries on both sides into breaking their
ceasefire. The fear of a failed ceasefire intensified immediately after the
last of the prisoners were released on July 28, 2000, as violence between
paramilitary organizations erupted. The protestant Shankill Road area of
Belfast witnessed, in August 2000, a deadly "turf-war" between loyalist
organizations. 217 It is unknown if this violence was perpetrated by
released prisoners, but it does signify that paramilitary organizations bene-
fited from the Good Friday Agreement, and that their peaceful neighbors
received nothing. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Bureau released
figures in the 2000 summer that loyalist and republican terrorists had
killed fifty-five men, women, and children since the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement.218 The loyalist feud of August 2000 also led to reports
that the republican terrorists squads "were being put on standby in the
case the loyalist feud erupts in sectarian violence. '219 Of course, the great-
est cause for the threat of continued paramilitary violence is the failure to
enforce the decommissioning provisions of the Good Friday Agreement.
An end to the ceasefires would signify the ultimate failure of the Good Fri-
day Agreement, and the only beneficiaries of the whole process would be
the violent organizations that secured the early, and unwarranted, release
of its members.
Conclusion
The early-release provisions were indeed a political necessity in the forma-
tion of the Good Friday Agreement,220 and it is not the purpose of this
Note to second-guess the non-paramilitary signatories of the Good Friday
Agreement. Releases following previous conflicts on the island set a dan-
gerous precedent, as paramilitaries came to expect that they were entitled
to releases. The Good Friday Agreement ends a conflict that was inher-
ently different from the previous conflicts, one characterized by violence
directed against both military and civilian targets.
International law, however, did not require the early release provisions
of the Good Friday Agreement, as many of the paramilitary prisoners did
217. Mervyn Pauley, City Gripped by Fear of Turf-War, BELFAST NEwS LE=TER, Aug. 22,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, BELNWS File.
218. William Ross, Agreement Has Sown the Seeds of Lawlessness, BELFAST NEwvs Lr-
TER, Aug. 25, 2000, at 8.
219. Mervyn Pauley, Pauley on Politics: Loyalist Feud Could Wreck Institutions, BELFAST
NEws LETTER, Aug. 28, 2000, at 6. Reports in March 2000 speculating that the IRA had
established a division in Glasgow, Scotland, and that the IRA would use this base to
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not fit into the traditional definition of prisoners of war or political prison-
ers. The crimes that were excused under the Good Friday Agreement were
at best quasi-political: ruthless, sectarian violence committed in the name
of a "cause." These crimes resemble gang wars more than they resemble
revolution.
Though releases have occurred, other components of the agreement,
such as those pertaining to the decommissioning process and the Northern
Ireland Assembly, have not been realized. And although the ceasefires have
held, localized sectarian violence continues. If the Good Friday Agreement
and the ceasefires do not survive the crucial next few months, it would be
extremely easy to attribute the failure to the early release program.
